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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BLAISE TROMBETTI,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44980
Canyon County Case No.
CR-2016-12014

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Trombetti failed to establish the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with four years fixed, for domestic battery with
traumatic injury or by relinquishing jurisdiction?

Trombetti Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Trombetti pled guilty to domestic battery with traumatic injury, and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp.62-64.) The district court subsequently entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction from which
Trombetti filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.65-66, 75-77.)
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Trombetti asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his difficult childhood, drug
addiction, and his purported remorse and acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.35.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for domestic battery with traumatic injury is 10 years.
I.C. § 18-918(2). The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with four years
fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines.

(R., pp.62-64.)

The sentence was also

warranted by the conduct underlying the charge in this case. Trombetti became angry at the
victim, Michelle, because she “was away from the house for approximately one hour and left
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without him.” (PSI, p.3.) When Michelle tried to call the police, Trombetti “put his forearm
across [Michelle’s] neck,” “put one of his hands over her mouth, restricting her ability to
breathe,” and “punched her in the head several times.” (PSI, p.3.) When Michelle tried to run
away, Trombetti “drug her back inside the residence and threw her on the couch,” “grabbed a
steak knife from the kitchen,” and ran towards Michelle with the knife in his hand. (PSI, p.3.)
“The dispatch operator could hear Michelle crying hysterically and [Trombetti] in the
background calling Michelle a whore.” (PSI, p.2.) As a result of the altercation, Michelle had
scratches on her legs and cuts on her hands. (PSI, p.3.) Under any reasonable view of the facts,
Trombetti’s 10-year sentence, with four years fixed, is not excessive.
Trombetti claims otherwise, noting his “difficult childhood and his history of drug
addiction, along with the potential to overcome that addiction, serve as strong mitigation in his
case.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) While potentially mitigating, none of these factors required the
court to impose a lesser sentence. With respect to Trombetti’s “history of drug addiction,” the
district court specifically acknowledged Trombetti’s “significant substance [abuse] issue” prior
to imposing sentence, but concluded that the objectives of sentencing warranted a 10-year
sentence, with four years fixed, with the opportunity to participate in the retained jurisdiction
program. (Sent. Tr., p.19, L.14 – p.20, L.6.) Further, although addiction may be central to
Trombetti’s criminal conduct, it is his obligation to not only acknowledge his addiction, but to
address it rather than use it as an excuse; Trombetti has failed to do so. Instead, Trombetti
stopped attending outpatient substance abuse treatment after “approximately one month” and
told the presentence investigator that he “desires sobriety,” but “does not believe he needs
treatment at this time.” (PSI, p.11.) Trombetti has failed to meet his burden of showing that his
10-year sentence, with four years fixed, for domestic battery with traumatic injury is excessive.
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Trombetti next argues that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction, claiming the district court did so “without sufficient information to make the
determination that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.5.) This is so, Trombetti claims, because he was only allowed to participate in the
retained jurisdiction program for two months, rather than the full 365 days allowed by I.C. § 192601(4). (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) This claim also fails.
Whether to place a defendant on probation or relinquish jurisdiction are both matters
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion. I.C. § 19-2601(4); see State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9,
10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A
court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial
court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct.
App. 1984).
Trombetti’s participation in the retained jurisdiction program, while brief and shorter than
the maximum period of time authorized, was defined by poor behavior. Trombetti received three
formal disciplinary sanctions in less than one month, and 18 informal sanctions in the span of 48
days. (PSI, p.58.) Trombetti “argue[d] about any feedback he receive[d],” failed to “implement
anything into his daily life,” and “[e]ventually” got “angry and stop[ped] participating.” (PSI,
p.60.) Trombetti demonstrated a “lack” of “desire for change,” “minimize[d] his actions,” much
like he did in relation to his underlying criminal offense, and “staff shop[ped]” to “get the answer
he [was] seeking.” (PSI, p.60; Sent. Tr., p.18, L.21 – p.19, L.5.) According to Trombetti, the
rules were “stupid” and he apparently did not think he needed to follow them based on his belief
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that the court would not “send [him] to do [his] time for not tucking in [his] shirt or for using the
restroom.” (PSI, p.62.) As a result of Trombetti’s poor attitude and behavior, NICI staff
recommended relinquishment after approximately two months. (PSI, p.55.) The district court
followed that recommendation. (R., pp.65-66.) Contrary to Trombetti’s argument, the district
court had more than enough information (21 total sanctions in 48 days) to determine that
Trombetti was not a good candidate for probation. Trombetti’s view that he does not have to
abide by rules if he believes the rules are “stupid” is exactly the opposite of the attitude required
for a successful probationer.

It is irrelevant whether Trombetti’s “violations” could be

characterized as “severe” or “criminal” (Appellant’s Brief, p.5), but it is relevant that he cannot
follow rules, which is what probation requires.

Neither NICI nor the district court were

obligated to accommodate Trombetti’s attitude or behavior for any additional time, much less the
full 365 days available, before concluding that relinquishment was the proper course of action.
Trombetti has failed to meet his burden of showing otherwise.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Trombetti’s conviction and sentence
and the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2017.

__/s/_Jessica M. Lorello_______
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of September, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Jessica M. Lorello_______
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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